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Abstract: This review considers theory and evidence for abnormal information processing in post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). Cognitive studies have indicated sensitivity in PTSD for traumatic information, more so than general 
emotional information. These findings were supported by neuroimaging studies that identify increased brain activity 
during traumatic cognition, especially in affective networks (including the amygdala, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortex). In theory, it is proposed that traumatic cognition may interfere with neutral cognition and there is evidence of 
abnormal neutral stimulus processing in PTSD. Firstly, PTSD patients perform poorly on a variety of neuropsychology 
tasks that involve attention and memory for neutral information. The evidence from event-related potentials and 
functional neuroimaging also indicates abnormal results in PTSD during neutral stimulus processing. The research 
evidence generally provides support for theories of trauma sensitivity and abnormal neutral stimulus processing in PTSD. 
However, there is only tentative evidence that trauma cognition concurrently interferes with neutral cognition. There is 
even some evidence that traumatic or novelty arousal processes can increase the capacity for attentive processing, thereby 
enhancing cognition for neutral stimulus information. Research on this topic has not yet fully explored the mechanisms of 
interaction between traumatic and neutral content in the cognitive dynamics of PTSD.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
  This review reconsiders theory and research on 
information processing in PTSD [see also 1-7]. There is an 
emphasis on cognitive and neuropsychological theories of 
PTSD, which are used to interpret research studies. The aim 
is to evaluate findings related to cognition and affect in 
PTSD, especially studies of brain activity related to attention 
and memory functions [see also 8-10]. This review considers 
studies of traumatic and neutral cognition in PTSD, which 
have often been two separate, yet complimentary, research 
domains. In essence, theory and research indicate that PTSD 
involves a shift in awareness towards traumatic cognition, at 
the cost of effective neutral information processing.  
2. CLINICAL PHENOMENA  
  The impetus for PTSD is a life threatening experience, 
with intense, often overwhelming, horror, fear, or 
helplessness [11]. A traumatic experience can induce many 
of the most common psychiatric symptoms, such as stress, 
phobia, panic attacks, and depression [8]. The defining 
symptoms of PTSD are recurrent traumatic memories 
(including flashbacks and nightmares), trying to avoid 
traumatic cognitions (through withdrawal and emotional 
numbing), and hyperactive stress responses [11]. PTSD is a 
chronic and debilitating disorder, which persists beyond an 
acute stress reaction that resolves within three months [11-
14]. Some studies indicate that PTSD affects 15-30% of 
combat or disaster survivors [15, 16] and 18-42% of people 
with physical injuries [17].  
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  As many trauma victims do not develop PTSD, there 
must be important individual differences in susceptibility to 
the impact of trauma [2, 8, 18, 19]. Susceptibility to PTSD is 
related to many factors (such as genetic risk, prior stressful 
events, and social support), yet most studies indicate the 
primary determinants of PTSD are the proximity, intensity, 
and duration of the traumatic event [11, 20-27]. If qualities 
of the traumatic experience are the most important predictors 
of PTSD, understanding how PTSD develops requires 
assessment of the trauma impact on stress physiology, affect 
appraisals and the integrity of cognitive systems [2, 18, 28-
32]. It is important to understand how the acute stress 
response is resolved, and to know more about the enduring 
cognitive and emotional changes that become PTSD [19].  
3. COGNITIVE THEORY OF PTSD  
  Essentially, PTSD is a failure to resolve an intense 
emotional experience [5, 18, 33]. While adapting to life after 
trauma, PTSD patients suffer persistent, intrusive, 
recollections of the incident (i.e., reminders, vivid flashbacks 
and nightmares). Their traumatic memories can be triggered 
by any cues that resemble or symbolize the trauma, a process 
of associative conditioning that leads to anxiety and 
hypervigilance for such cues. Moreover, their traumatic 
recollections can occur in many neutral circumstances, 
lending greater potential for otherwise neutral cues to trigger 
intrusions, which increases the pressure to be vigilant for 
diverse cues. Hence, PTSD patients actively avoid any 
circumstances related to their trauma. Their avoidance can 
amount to an intense emotional numbing and withdrawal, 
including apathy for enjoyable activities and loss of empathy 
and intimacy with others.  
  Horowitz [33] identified these states of intrusion and 
avoidance as a necessary cyclical pattern of gradual 30    The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2008, Volume 2  Darren L. Weber 
adaptation to trauma, wherein extreme tension between these 
states may prolong the process of resolution. In PTSD, 
extreme avoidance can hinder adaptive interactions with new 
circumstances, leaving a person stuck in a trauma response 
pattern. In general, reconciliation to the traumatic event, and 
it’s consequences, entails significant affective and cognitive 
dissonance [34]. A catastrophic experience conflicts with 
beliefs of safety or invulnerability, which can prompt a 
reassessment of personal security and the risks of danger in 
the environment. The persistent replay of traumatic 
memories may help to extract more information about 
exactly what happened and why it happened, which can be 
incorporated into a new world view that will shape future 
expectations and values [35].  
  This information is particularly important in the 
determination of causal attributions. Our understanding of 
the relationships between our actions and outcomes form a 
great part of our self efficacy [36-38]. It has been shown that 
habitual patterns of causal attribution are related to general 
motivation and affective dispositions, including helplessness 
and depression [39-41]. PTSD patients are likely to attribute 
causes for negative events to external, stable, and 
uncontrollable sources [42]. This lack of perceived control 
over negative life events may be related to low self-efficacy, 
helplessness and depression [43- 45]. PTSD patients also 
attribute the causes of positive events to external and 
uncontrollable sources [42]; they believe that positive 
experiences do not result from their own actions and, 
therefore, they cannot derive pride or self-esteem from their 
achievements. Coupled with fearful perceptions of the 
environment and expectations of uncontrollable danger, their 
hope and desire to act positively can waver. One study has 
shown that when PTSD patients confront stressful 
interpersonal relations, they tend to adopt an emotion 
focused strategy, rather than a more effective problem 
focused strategy, to resolve the difficulty [46, 47]. Rather 
than take action to remedy the situation, PTSD patients tend 
to withdraw into their feelings of distress and helplessness.  
  Recovery from trauma may depend critically on the 
capacity for attending to the present moment [48]. In 1889, 
French physician and philosopher Pierre Janet proposed that 
traumatic experiences remain encapsulated within their own 
psychic arena, dissociated from normal consciousness [49-
51]. He proposed that effective treatment requires translation 
of the traumatic representations into narratives, often through 
the use of hypnotic states that allow direct manipulation of 
the trauma experience. Moreover, he proposed it is important 
to encourage alternative, non-trauma mental states, mainly 
through developing the ability to interact with clarity and 
purpose in the present [18, 51].  
  The capacity for attending to the present is a process of 
directing and integrating sensory awareness, within a context 
of adaptive cognitive structures, to develop and carry out 
action plans. Efficient behavior in new circumstances 
involves integrating current experiences with abstractions 
from previous experiences, which provide general guidelines 
for prediction of outcomes in similar situations [52-56]. If 
there is any failure to develop and maintain the integrity of 
general cognitive schemata for everyday living, the difficulty 
in doing many ordinary activities increases, especially under 
stressful conditions.  
  A traumatic experience may disrupt cognition by not 
only evoking overwhelming emotions, but also failing to 
integrate into general cognitive schemata [2, 30, 57-60]. The 
trauma leaves a unique memory of salient perceptions, 
emotions, and reactions. As the traumatic event threatens 
survival, it can prompt persistent re-analysis to identify 
potential cues for future avoidance, and this traumatic 
rumination has been associated with PTSD [61]. However, it 
is a novel, unique experience, so there are few, if any, prior 
experiences for comparison, which makes it difficult to 
evaluate and understand the trauma. In addition, evaluation 
of trauma memories may be complicated because they lack 
the spatio-temporal coherence of most episodic memories 
[62]. The overwhelming emotion at the time of the trauma 
can provoke dissociative states that fragment the experience 
[50, 62]. Also, the looming vulnerability experienced during 
a traumatic incident engages heightened levels of arousal, 
with implications for immediate action [63]. These 
hyperarousal states can engage sensory and action processes 
that bypass cognitive appraisal processes, which require 
more time to evaluate and integrate current perceptions with 
previous experiences. The intensity of the experience leaves 
strong sensory, affective and action memory traces that are 
particular to the traumatic experience. The circumstances of 
a trauma may be common, but the novel and threatening 
traumatic event can leave primary sensory, vivid snapshots 
of experience. The snapshots may be fragmented, as 
hyperarousal distorts perception during traumatic incidents. 
This may expose the temporal delays inherent in the 
perception process, which involves integration of 
information distributed across many parallel processing 
systems [64, 65]. Split-second perceptions and reactions can 
make the difference between life and death in traumatic 
situations. These fast perceptions and actions may be 
difficult to encode into coherent episodic memories [4]. The 
elements of traumatic experience are not easily translated 
into linguistic narratives, which usually require coherent 
causal relations among perceptions [4, 5, 50, 51]. The 
intrusive re-experiencing of traumatic memories may 
continue to overwhelm normal cognitive states, which can 
perpetuate the fragmentation of traumatic cognitions. The 
repetitive memories can lead to sensitization and persistence 
of the traumatic experiences, with the potential for greater 
elaboration and consolidation across successive intrusions 
[10, 66]. In PTSD there is a separation of traumatic from 
normal experience and the traumatic content becomes 
encapsulated into a particular trauma schema [10, 58].  
  Any activation of associations into their trauma schema 
can prompt PTSD patients to slip into a traumatic awareness, 
wherein it is more likely they will interpret current 
experiences in relation to their trauma. According to 
Chemtob et al. [58, p. 266], “. . . threat arousal inhibits the 
operation of other information-processing modes or 
schemata, thereby preventing their operation and further 
narrowing the attentional focus on threat-related stimuli.” 
Their conception emphasises that traumatic cognitions 
dominate awareness, possibly within a dissociated state. It is 
also possible that traumatic cognitions, at some level, 
coincide with neutral cognitions. Nevertheless, the activation 
of traumatic schemata can develop higher expectations that 
threatening or traumatic events can occur. Hence, PTSD 
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or novel events as threatening, so their stress responses could 
be more consistently elevated in new circumstances. This 
sensitivity to ambiguity or novelty can distract attention from 
current activities, which interrupts the development of 
cognitive structures for relating to neutral circumstances.  
4. TRAUMA SENSITIVITY  
  This section reviews traumatic information processing in 
PTSD [see also 1, 3, 60]. The research demonstrates greater 
attention and stress responses for traumatic information in 
PTSD. This section can be compared with the following 
sections, which review neuropsychological theory and 
neuroimaging studies of neutral information processing in 
PTSD.  
4.1. Cognitive Psychology  
4.1.1. Attention to Threat  
  Trandel and McNally [67] investigated unconscious 
threat sensitivity in Vietnam veterans (15 combat veterans 
with PTSD, 15 non-combat veterans with alcohol 
dependence, and 15 noncombat veterans; groups were 
matched for race, age, and education). In a dichotic listening 
task, the veterans repeated a series of neutral words 
presented to their right ear (unrelated neutral words were 
used to minimize semantic associations). The simultaneous 
series in the left ear contained words from the following four 
categories: threatening words for Vietnam veterans, words 
phonemically similar to those words, threatening words for 
agoraphobics and obsessive-compulsives, and neutral words. 
Trandel and McNally [67] measured unconscious processing 
as the number of times that veterans made an error on the 
next word after they correctly repeated a word that was 
paired with a threatening word in the left ear. In this case, 
there is no immediate shift of conscious attention to the 
threatening word in the left ear, but a degree of unconscious 
semantic processing that interferes with listening to the 
following neutral word in the right ear. The results indicated 
that PTSD patients had only a few more errors than other 
subjects after the presentation of threatening words 
(statistical analysis revealed no significant group differences 
in errors). Trandel and McNally [67] also hypothesized that 
unconscious processing of threatening words should be 
associated with autonomic arousal, but there were no 
significant group differences in skin conductance related to 
threatening words. These findings may be partially attributed 
to the low sensitivity of their study, they presented only 
seven threatening words among a series of 3,600 words.  
  It is difficult to assess automatic semantic processing in 
dichotic listening tasks. Trandel and McNally [67] assessed 
unconscious interference with shadowing, but the 
requirement that unconscious processing should not be 
associated with errors in shadowing the current word 
presentation strictly limits the evaluation of automatic 
processes. It may be possible that automatic semantic 
processing interferes with concurrent shadowing by 
provoking conscious awareness of meaning, so a strict 
constraint of the evaluation of unconscious automatic 
semantic processing is required in the dichotic listening task 
[68]. Although PTSD patients may not be unconsciously 
processing threatening information, this does not imply that 
they are not susceptible to automatic processing of 
threatening information. Sensitive threat-related sensory, 
perceptual, or semantic representations may respond 
automatically to threatening information and facilitate 
conscious awareness of that information [68]. In threatening 
situations, such as combat, automaticity of complex reflex 
actions and diversion of cognitive resources to deal with 
danger can make the difference between life or death.  
  Another method to investigate automatic threat 
processing is an affective Stroop task -it involves naming the 
printed color of words with affective similarity to the 
symptoms of psychopathology [69]. Automatic semantic 
encoding and associative processing can stimulate affective 
responses, which can interfere with the primary task of 
naming the word color [68]. Stroop interference related to 
threatening information reflects automatic activation of 
threat-related semantic and affective associations, including 
avoidance processes.  
  Studies of a modified Stroop task demonstrate greater 
attention for traumatic words in PTSD. For example, 
Cassiday, Mc-Nally, and Zeitlin [70] examined affective 
Stroop interference in victims of sexual assault with PTSD, 
without PTSD, and a normal control group (groups were 
matched for race, sex, age, and education; the mean time 
since trauma was 9.42 years, with a range of 0.3-34.0 years). 
The task comprised colored words from four word types: 
high threat (rape, penis), moderate threat (emergency, 
crime), positive (love, happy), and neutral (polite, moderate). 
These words were randomly presented in either a mixed 
manner or blocked according to word type (neutral, positive, 
moderate-threat, and high-threat, in that order). For the 
neutral and positive words, color naming was slower during 
the mixed series than the blocked stimuli, but responses for 
high and moderate threat words were unaffected by the 
presentation format. In general, PTSD patients responded 
slower to high-threat words than moderate-threat and 
positive words, which they were slower to respond to than 
neutral words. Also, PTSD patients responded slower to 
high-threat, moderate-threat, and positive words than all 
other subjects. Similarly, rape victims without PTSD were 
slower to respond to high-threat words than other words and 
they were slower to respond to high-threat words than 
normal control subjects. Furthermore, response latency for 
high-threat words in all rape victims was significantly 
associated with the intrusion sub-scale, but not the avoidance 
sub-scale of the Impact of Events Scale (IES). Many rape 
victims without PTSD had previously qualified for a 
diagnosis of PTSD and the results indicate that they had a 
residual sensitivity for stimuli related to their traumatic 
experience, suggesting that the cognitive schemata 
associated with a traumatic experience can persist for some 
time after the remission of PTSD symptoms. Since the 
sensitivity for threatening information was associated with 
intrusions, the primary symptom of PTSD, it is not 
surprising that the rape victims with chronic PTSD 
demonstrated slower responses than rape victims without 
PTSD to the high-threat words, suggesting they have a 
greater sensitivity or coherence of their trauma 
representations. Most importantly, this study shows that the 
presence of traumatic information in the mixed blocks 
interfered with color naming of the neutral words, providing 
important research evidence to support the contention that 
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stimulus processing [58]. These findings of threat sensitivity 
in the affective Stroop task pertain to PTSD resulting from 
various trauma, including Vietnam combat [71], sexual 
assault [70, 72], a ferry disaster [73] and motor vehicle 
accidents [74]. Most of these studies support the hypothesis 
that PTSD patients have a sensitive threat-related schema, 
which is different from that of other anxiety disorders, but 
the generality of their trauma schema may be restricted to 
information that is closely associated with the original 
threatening experience [74]. In most of these studies, trauma 
sensitivity is positively associated with the severity of PTSD 
symptoms, especially traumatic intrusions [70, 71]. 
Furthermore, there is residual sensitivity after recovery from 
PTSD; so although symptoms abate, the underlying trauma 
schema persists [70, 73].  
4.1.2. Memory for Threat  
  Several studies demonstrate memory biases for traumatic 
information [75-79]. For example, Zeitlin and McNally [75] 
assessed implicit and explicit memory for threat-related 
information in PTSD. They hypothesized that PTSD patients 
have an active threat schema, such that implicit and explicit 
memory for threatening information will be greater in PTSD. 
They evaluated Vietnam combat veterans with (n=24) and 
without (n=24) PTSD. Subjects were not matched for age, 
education, or combat exposure, but there was no significant 
influence of age or education on recall. They were presented 
with a list of words, related to combat, social threat, and 
positive or neutral affect. Half of the subjects were required 
to rate how much they liked each word (elaborate encoding) 
and half of the subjects were required to count the letters in 
each word (feature encoding). After counting backwards, 
subjects performed a word stem completion task with the 
first word that comes to mind (implicit memory) and a cued 
recall task with a word that was seen earlier (explicit 
memory). Half of the word stems in the implicit and explicit 
memory tasks were presented during encoding, so memory 
performance could be assessed for both primed and 
unprimed words. Combat veterans with PTSD recalled fewer 
neutral and positive words than combat veterans without 
PTSD. Zeitlin and McNally [75] propose that this reflects a 
lack of attention to this information, since cognitive 
resources are utilized to process or avoid processing 
threatening information. This information processing bias 
was reflected in recall; relative to recall for neutral words, 
PTSD patients recalled more combat words than combat 
veterans without PTSD. The recall for combat words was 
significantly associated with combat exposure. Since combat 
veterans with PTSD had more combat exposure than combat 
veterans without PTSD, this recall bias may be attributed to 
either greater combat exposure or PTSD. However, combat 
veterans with PTSD had an implicit memory bias for 
unprimed combat words, which was enhanced by priming. 
This implicit memory bias was significantly associated with 
the severity of PTSD after controlling the degree of combat 
exposure. Thus, an implicit bias for combat words in combat 
veterans with PTSD reflects a chronic activation of elaborate 
and stable sensory, perceptual or semantic memories for 
combat experiences in the PTSD group. The activation of 
these unconscious representations will easily promote 
conscious awareness of the trauma information. Thus, the 
intrusions of combat veterans with PTSD may result from a 
heightened activation or sensitization of unconscious combat 
memories.  
  These memory biases apply to episodic memories of 
events and also autobiographical memories [76, 77]. For 
example, McNally et al. [76] investigated episodic memory 
for personal experience of positive and negative affect in 
Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD (n=39), veterans with 
other psychiatric conditions (n=20), and veterans without 
psychiatric morbidity (n=23). Subjects were presented with a 
short series of either furniture pictures (accompanied by 
classical piano) or Vietnam combat pictures (accompanied 
by combat sounds). Subjects rated their moods before and 
after the presentations. Also, after the presentations, subjects 
recalled a personal experience of some specific emotions, 
including positive states (e.g., comradeship, humor, 
devotion, gaiety, intimate, kindness, happiness, loyalty, 
affection, and bravery), negative states (e.g., boredom, 
sickness, anxiety, misery, fatigue, shame, panic, sadness, 
ignorance, and hostility), and neutral states (e.g., 
mathematics, amazement, background, determination, 
reflection, illusion, hierarchy, agreement, gravity, and 
appearance). Relative to furniture pictures, the pictures of 
Vietnam combat reduced happy, positive mood states and 
increased negative mood states (anxiety, anger, emotional 
arousal). Among veterans with PTSD, veterans exposed to 
combat pictures recalled more episodes of neutral affect, but 
not positive or negative affect, than veterans exposed to 
furniture pictures (this could reflect a process of emotional 
numbing). Veterans without morbidity reported more 
episodes of positive or negative emotion than neutral affect, 
veterans with other psychiatric conditions reported more 
experiences of negative affect than neutral affect, and 
veterans with PTSD recalled more experiences of negative 
than positive emotion. In general, veterans with PTSD were 
less specific than veterans without morbidity and they 
recalled more negative and Vietnam memories. Veterans 
with PTSD had higher levels of depression, anxiety, and 
combat exposure than other subjects. These results indicate 
that veterans with PTSD have difficulty recalling specific 
emotional experiences, but when they do recall emotional 
experiences, they are more often about negative or traumatic 
experiences. This bias in recollection may play an important 
role in the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, so 
any increase in the recall of positive personal experience 
may counteract the bias and alleviate symptoms of PTSD 
[76]. In another study, McNally et al. [77] found that 
Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD have a deficit in their 
focus of attention or episodic memory for specific 
experiences of positive feelings about themselves. Most 
people focus on positive personal attributes more so than 
negative personal attributes, but veterans with PTSD have no 
such bias. This could be related to disturbances in self-
representation and affect, including low self-efficacy, guilt, 
sorrow, and numbing of positive emotional experience [77] 
[see also 40].  
4.2. Cognitive Electrophysiology  
  Event-related potentials (ERPs) are employed to measure 
brain responses to specific events, often auditory and visual 
stimuli, with a high temporal resolution (msec). The stimulus 
evoked responses, such as the P50 and P1/N1/P2 complex, 
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cortical areas (within 100 msec), while later endogenous 
ERPs, such as the N2/P3 complex, indicate more complex 
cortical processing. The activity indicated by these ERPs is 
modulated by cognitive processes such as attention and 
memory [80-93]. Cognitive ERP studies investigate the 
components of sensory processing and attention that are 
affected by trauma sensitivity in PTSD. These biological 
indices provide insight into the stages of information 
processing, from sensation to perception and memory, that 
are activated by traumatic information in PTSD [see also 
94].  
  Attias, Bleich, and Gilat [95] investigated sensitivity to 
trauma in Israeli combat veterans using a visual oddball task 
with common pictures (furniture and flowers, 60%), rare 
target pictures (domestic animals, 20%) and rare combat 
pictures (20%). Combat veterans with PTSD had larger N1 
and P3 amplitudes and shorter P3 latency for the combat 
pictures [see also 96, 97]. An increase in N1 amplitude may 
reflect an early, automatic allocation of attention to 
identification and discrimination of the physical attributes of 
stimulus information; in this case, it suggests that PTSD 
patients automatically orient to traumatic images. In 
addition, larger P3 amplitude for combat pictures indicates 
greater attention to evaluation of the significance or meaning 
of the traumatic images, which depends on prior exposure 
and sensitivity to their traumatic content. Also, P3 latency 
for traumatic images was positively associated with the 
frequency of traumatic intrusions. Furthermore, a 
discriminant function, based on P3 amplitude in response to 
combat pictures alone, correctly identified 85-90% of 
veterans with PTSD and 95% of veterans without PTSD. 
These results clearly indicate sensitivity to traumatic 
information in PTSD, at several levels of attentive 
processing.  
  However, these effects were not entirely specific to 
traumatic information. The P3 activity in PTSD was 
enhanced for both neutral targets and combat distracters; 
controls had larger P3 activity for neutral targets than 
combat images [96]. Also, there was some indication that 
traumatic images might interfere with processing neutral 
targets, because there was delayed P3 and reaction times for 
the neutral targets in PTSD [96]. These results may provide 
partial support for the theory that activation of a trauma 
schema in PTSD can enhance traumatic, but interfere with 
neutral information processing [58, 59].  
  Several studies have investigated the sensitivity of PTSD 
patients to both traumatic and non-traumatic emotional 
stimuli [98, 99] [see also 100]. Firstly, Kounios et al. [98] 
reported an ERP study of visual word stimuli that comprised 
common words (neutral or combat related) and rare target 
words (foods). Their findings indicate larger P3 amplitude 
for both combat and neutral words in PTSD (there was no 
difference in P3 activity between combat and neutral words). 
As in the previous work [96], this study also indicated larger 
P3 for all stimuli in the presence of traumatic stimuli. It is 
interesting that the frequency of combat stimuli was not a 
significant factor in eliciting enhanced responses; Attias et 
al. [96] presented combat stimuli rarely, whereas Kounios et 
al.  [98] presented frequent combat stimuli. Also, there 
appear to be no substantial differences between pictorial and 
word stimuli. In contrast, Stanford et al. [99] observed 
greater P3 activity for trauma words and smaller P3 activity 
for neutral words in PTSD patients. They observed an 
enhanced frontal P3 for trauma words [it was specific to 
trauma, it did not generalize to social threat words; cf. 79]. 
Thus, while these studies to date confirm enhanced 
responses to trauma in PTSD, they are inconclusive with 
respect to associated effects on concurrent neutral 
information [cf. 58, 59].  
  However, even this conclusion is compromised by one 
ERP study of emotional Stroop words, which indicated 
smaller and later P3 activity for all words in PTSD patients, 
even for trauma words [101]. For all combat veterans, this 
study confirmed delayed reaction times for traumatic words, 
which has been observed in emotional Stroop studies [e.g. 
71]. It also demonstrated that trauma words are related to 
greater frontal P3 than neutral words (for both PTSD and 
control subjects). This larger frontal P3 may confirm that 
delayed responses to emotional Stroop words reflect greater 
attention for the emotive words. However, the PTSD 
subjects had smaller and later parietal P3 ERPs than control 
subjects, so the PTSD patients were not evaluating those 
words as much as control subjects. This finding is 
inconsistent with the previous literature and theory on 
attention bias in PTSD, which clearly predicts greater 
responses for trauma words in PTSD. A large proportion of 
research findings appear to support this hypothesis, so it is 
difficult to reconcile this study with both theory and previous 
work. Perhaps the differences between studies reflect 
variations in the degree of intrusive or avoidance symptoms 
in patients or the nature of control groups. The differences 
might also depend critically on the absolute or relative 
frequency of presentation for neutral, emotive, threat, or 
trauma stimuli [c.f. 97]. Also, the nature of the stimulus 
information may be critical; perhaps PTSD patients are more 
sensitive to visual or auditory sounds associated with trauma 
than linguistic associations [50]. Further independent 
replication of this study would be valuable, with further 
consideration of intrusive and avoidance symptoms, control 
subjects, and frequency of stimulus presentations.  
 Kounios  et al. [98] also found smaller P100 ERP 
amplitude over the right posterior temporal region in PTSD, 
for a series of visual words that contained traumatic and 
neutral words (the observed effects were not differentiated 
for traumatic and neutral words). Their results indicate that 
there are diminished early visual responses for all words in 
the presence of traumatic information. The findings of 
Kounios et al. [98] are inconsistent with previous reports of 
enhanced N1 activity for combat pictures [i.e., 95, 96]. Thus, 
their results also indicate there are decreased responses 
during early processing of visual word stimuli in PTSD, even 
if the stimuli are traumatic.  
4.2.1. Emotional Generalization  
  If the sensitivity to traumatic information is a general, 
reliable finding, it could be due to general emotional arousal, 
not necessarily related to traumatic information. Blomhoff, 
Reinvang, and Malt [102] investigated responses to 
emotional words in PTSD. They used an auditory P3 oddball 
task that comprised standard tones (800 Hz, 60%), target 
tones (1200 Hz, 20%), and distracters generated from spoken 
words (20%). In separate task blocks, the distracters were 34    The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2008, Volume 2  Darren L. Weber 
either non-words or words of negative or positive emotion
1.
 
They proposed that any emotional words could be associated 
with traumatic arousal, so they will capture attention and 
elicit larger P3 activity. Moreover, the emotional words 
(especially negative words) should distract attention from the 
primary task and lead to smaller P3 activity for target events, 
especially for PTSD patients. The P3 amplitude for targets 
suggested less activity in PTSD for all distracter conditions, 
but the statistical analysis found no significant group 
differences (the study may lack power to detect these effects 
due to a small sample size). Analysis of the ERP activity for 
the distracter stimuli indicated biphasic P3 activity, with a 
larger peak at 160-280 msec followed by a smaller peak at 
280-420 msec (it was clearest for negative words). The P3 
activity was larger for emotive than for non-word distracters 
between 150-300 msec for all subjects. At the group level, 
there were no significant differences in the P3 responses to 
emotive distracters (after subtracting the responses for non-
words). The initial conclusion from these analyses was that 
the ERP activity for target tones and for emotive distracters 
was normal in PTSD. However, there were significant 
associations between P3 activity for emotive words and 
PTSD symptoms (measured for all subjects, controlling for 
variance explained by non-words). For positive words, there 
was a positive association for posterior P3 activity at 150-
300 msec with both arousal and avoidance. For negative 
words, there was a positive association between arousal and 
P3 activity at 300-450 msec in right frontal and posterior 
regions. For all emotive words, there was a positive 
association between avoidance and frontal P3 activity at 300-
450 msec (this could mean that avoidance is related to 
greater semantic processing for emotive words, rather than 
inhibition of processing). Essentially, these results indicate 
that P3 activity for emotional information is related to 
arousal and avoidance symptoms, but not intrusive 
symptoms, in trauma victims. On the basis of these 
multivariate regression analyses, this study provides 
tentative evidence that trauma sensitivity can generalize to 
any emotional words. It is not known whether these findings 
for auditory emotive words also apply to visual images. 
Given some hypotheses about abnormal linguistic functions 
in PTSD, the strength of a general emotive sensitivity may 
be clearer for visual images in PTSD.  
 Although  Blomhoff  et al. [102] employed a valuable task 
design, the study could not control for important diagnostic 
criteria. It was limited to a small sample of ship disaster 
survivors, where most but not all patients satisfied all the 
criteria for PTSD and many of them had comorbid 
depression. Also, the control group were disaster survivors 
and some of them met criteria for depression also. 
Avoidance, emotional numbing and depression in PTSD 
patients may decrease their P300 responses to emotive 
stimuli [see also 103-105]. Also, some evidence indicates 
that depression is related to abnormal P300 activity [106- 
110] [see also 111, 112]. Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
PTSD patients and controls were matched for demographic 
and psychometric qualities, such as intelligence. Hence, the 
                                                 
1Negative words included ‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘anxiety’; positive words 
included ‘joy’, ‘contentment’; and nonwords were reversed negative words 
(complex, meaningless stimuli). Each word was recorded by a male speaker, 
with a duration of 500-1000 msec. All stimuli presented at 95 dB. 
results of the study are tentative, pending a sound 
replication.  
  In a study of responses to emotive faces, Felmingham et 
al. [113] employed ERPs at occipital and posterior temporal 
scalp sites to measure early cortical responses to emotive 
faces (angry and neutral faces). They did not use a masked 
presentation; instead they presented alternating angry and 
neutral faces, with only passive viewing required. They 
reasoned that automatic emotive responses could induce a 
feedback modulation of visual cortical processing in striate 
and extrastriate face perception regions. Prior studies of 
normal subjects identified enhanced responses to emotive 
stimuli between 80-160 ms over fronto-central and posterior 
scalp regions. Similarly, Felmingham et al. [113] identified 
an enhanced negative peak at 110 ms over occipital and 
posterior temporal sites for angry vs. neutral faces in control 
subjects. These ERP components were smaller and slower 
for PTSD patients, and they did not discriminate between the 
angry and neutral facial expressions [113]. Felmingham et 
al.  [113] interpret these findings as a refutation of the 
generalized threat sensitivity hypothesis in PTSD. Rather, 
they propose the findings are explained by a general failure 
of sensory discrimination processes.  
  While this may be true, another possibility is that sensory 
processing of all stimuli in this study were inhibited by top-
down avoidance processes, given that stimuli were regular, 
predictable and they were not masked [cf. 114]. This could 
be consistent with both generally smaller amplitude and later 
peak activity of even the early visual ERP components. As in 
the study of Shin et al. [115, see below], passive viewing of 
threat or trauma images may not reveal enhanced responses 
in PTSD patients, who are likely to engage avoidance 
processing strategies. Rather, the enhanced sensitivity to 
threat and trauma stimuli appears to be a transient effect for 
masked and rare novel stimuli [114], which may escape top-
down avoidance processing and engage novelty attention 
processes. The only other paradigm to elicit enhanced 
responses is script-driven imagery, which requires voluntary 
sustained attention for traumatic emotions and cognitions 
[e.g., 114, see below].  
  The aversive sensitivity in PTSD appears to be specific to 
the trauma, but tentative evidence suggests otherwise. 
Further evidence is required to explore whether traumatic 
sensitivity can be explained by a general emotional 
sensitivity. The work should characterize whether there is 
simply an associative generalization of traumatic sensitivity 
or a more pervasive emotional disturbance [see also 99, 103, 
116].  
4.3. Cognitive Neuroimaging  
  Functional neuroimaging includes measures of regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF) from positron emission 
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). There are now several studies of rCBF 
during traumatic cognition in PTSD [114, 115, 117] [see also 
3, 50, 118].  
 Rauch  et al. [114] used PET to investigate rCBF in PTSD 
during imagination of either traumatic or neutral 
experiences, prompted by listening to a tape recording of 
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PTSD patients had increased rCBF in limbic and paralimbic 
structures of the right hemisphere, including medial 
orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, insular, and anterior and 
medial temporal cortex, as well as the amygdala [114] [see 
also 119]. The orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate 
are engaged in the appraisal of emotional experience and 
monitoring conflicting demands [120, 121]. The amygdala, 
in particular, is involved in detection of threat and generation 
of fear, anger and associated autonomic and neuroendocrine 
responses [122, 123]. Another increase in rCBF was 
identified in secondary visual cortex, possibly related to 
traumatic visualization. In contrast, decreases in rCBF were 
found in left inferior frontal cortex (Broca’s area) and left 
middle temporal cortex, suggesting decreased linguistic 
cognitions during traumatic imagery [114, 115] [see also 50, 
124, 125].  
  These seminal findings were explored further by Shin et 
al.  [115], who investigated rCBF during (a) imagery of 
trauma, negative and neutral experiences and (b) visual 
presentations of trauma, negative and neutral stimuli (which 
were accompanied by an auditory description of the scene). 
This study did not identify increased activity in PTSD for 
combat pictures, compared with neutral pictures. Rather, 
there was decreased activity for PTSD patients in left middle 
frontal and anterior cingulate cortex. In contrast, the combat 
veterans without PTSD demonstrated increased activity for 
combat pictures in left middle frontal gyrus, Broca’s area, 
left superior temporal gyrus and left supramarginal gyrus 
(which may indicate greater auditory-verbal processing for 
the emotive combat pictures).  
  These findings of Shin et al. [115] are inconsistent with 
those to be expected, given theory on trauma sensitivity and 
prior findings of enhanced trauma responses in ERP studies 
[e.g., 95]. Perhaps the findings reflect avoidance in the 
PTSD patients. The PET procedure for blocked stimulus 
delivery is a continuous presentation of combat imagery, 
which may evoke an avoidance state in the PTSD subjects. 
For example, Bleich [97] observed that PTSD patients avoid 
processing repeated traumatic stimuli. They found that 
repeated combat pictures resulted in a rapid reduction in P3 
amplitude and an increase in P3 latency for PTSD subjects. 
In most ERP tasks, traumatic images are rare and they occur 
among various image classes, which reduces or eliminates 
the effects of repetition suppression. Hence, a possible 
explanation for these results of Shin et al. [115] may be that 
PTSD subjects avoid the repetitive traumatic stimuli 
(perhaps a single-trial fMRI design could be adopted to 
evaluate this).  
  Another component of the work from Shin et al. [115] 
was a mental imagery condition, where patients voluntarily 
engage traumatic cognitions. In this study, there was 
increased anterior cingulate activity in PTSD for combat 
imagery, compared with neutral imagery; a confirmation of 
the previous findings [114]. Furthermore, comparison of 
responses to combat imagery versus combat pictures 
revealed enhanced activation in the left hemisphere, 
including the middle frontal gyrus, ventral anterior cingulate 
gyrus, and the supramarginal gyrus. There was also 
enhanced activation in the right amygdala. This suggests that 
previous findings of anterior cingulate and amygdala activity 
for traumatic imagery [114] could be specific to the 
voluntary generation of traumatic cognitions.  
  Further work has confirmed enhanced responses in the 
amygdala for fearful expressions. Rauch et al. [126] 
investigated fMRI of combat PTSD during a masked facial 
presentation, where facial expressions were either fearful or 
happy. These emotive faces were displayed very briefly (30 
ms) and then masked by a longer neutral face expression 
(170 ms). This task design prevents controlled processing of 
the masked faces, thereby activating automatic emotional 
responses, with enhanced activity in the amygdala for the 
fearful faces. The results clearly demonstrated greater 
activation of the left amygdala for fearful faces, with PTSD 
patients demonstrating larger activity than combat veterans 
without PTSD [126] [see also 113].  
4.4. Psychophysiology  
  The activation of a trauma schema is associated with a 
peripheral fear or stress response and the feedback from that 
response reinforces the impact of the initial cognitive and 
affective appraisal. Psychophysiology studies of PTSD 
indicate that traumatic cues and mental imagery are often 
related to heightened startle responses and peripheral 
hyperactivity, including increases in heart rate and blood 
pressure, muscle tension, and skin conductivity [127-139].  
  Several research groups have pursued the use of 
objective measures of physiological arousal, in response to 
traumatic stimuli, to discriminate war veterans with and 
without PTSD. In a series of studies, Blanchard and 
colleagues have successfully discriminated veterans with or 
without PTSD on the basis of heart rate responses to combat 
sounds [62% correct [128]; 95% correct for veterans with 
PTSD and non-veteran controls [127]; 75%-83% correct 
[134]; 81% correct [140]; 86.4% correct [129]; [see also 141, 
142]]. They measured physiological responses to three 
conditions: (a) resting, (b) mental arithmetic, and (c) a 
combination of music, silence, and combat sounds that 
increase in loudness from 40 to 80 dB, in steps of 20 dB.  
 Blanchard  et al. [134] found that a discriminant function, 
based on heart rate alone, correctly identified 84% of combat 
veterans with PTSD and 75% of all veterans. Furthermore, 
the same discriminant function correctly identified 83% of 
another sample of combat veterans with or without PTSD. 
Gerardi  et al. [140] reported this discrimination has good 
short term test-retest reliability. Also, they reported that 
veterans with PTSD cannot consciously lower their 
physiological responses, so they appear to be without PTSD 
[cf. 139]. Also, although veterans without PTSD can elevate 
their responses to combat stimuli, it is still possible to 
discriminate them from veterans with PTSD with 85% 
accuracy using a discriminant function based on heart rate 
measures alone. Also, Casada [141] found that heart rate, 
more than electrodermal activity, was the most specific 
indicator of physiological arousal for traumatic content in 
PTSD.  
  In contrast, Pitman et al. [130] found that electrodermal 
activity was a better indicator of PTSD than heart rate. They 
assessed heart rate, forehead electromyogram (EMG), and 
skin conductance in response to unique combat incidents 
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that the traumatic content and severity of the events recalled 
were similar for veterans with or without PTSD. The 
physiological response to the unique combat imagery was 
greater in veterans with PTSD than veterans without PTSD. 
In particular, skin conductivity (73%), rather than forehead 
EMG (67%) or heart rate (64%), provided the best predictive 
discrimination of veterans with or without PTSD. A step-
wise discriminant function, based on all three measures, 
correctly classified all PTSD veterans. While the sensitivity 
was excellent, the specificity was not perfect; it had 79% 
accuracy for all veterans with or without PTSD. Also, 
physiological arousal was associated with the frequency of 
intrusions related to those traumatic events. Pit-man et al. 
[130] proposed that veterans with PTSD were “reliving” 
their traumatic experiences, whereas veterans without PTSD 
were merely “recollecting” their experience [cf. 139].  
  The discrepancy in the predictive value of skin 
conductance and heart rate between the research studies 
above might be partially explained by an increase in skin 
conductivity to specific traumatic imagery. Pitman et al. 
[130] found that skin conductance, but not heart rate, was 
greater in response to specific combat imagery than general 
combat imagery [see also 139]. There is contradictory 
evidence, however, in the results of Casada [141], which 
indicate that heart rate, more so than skin conductance, is a 
more specific indicator of traumatic arousal in PTSD [see 
also 139, 142].  
  Brende [143] reported that skin conductivity in response 
to traumatic imagery reflects the functioning of the 
contralateral hemisphere and that the left and right 
hemisphere play different roles in the symptoms of PTSD. 
Skin conductivity from the right hand is associated with 
hypervigilance and emotional numbing in PTSD and it 
reflects the function of the left hemisphere, which is related 
to logical, linguistic operations on information from the 
senses and the maintenance of high levels of vigilance for 
changes in stimulation [143]. The relationship between 
hypervigilance and emotional numbing is not very clear. It 
could be expected that hypervigilance will produce 
irritability and volatile emotions rather than numbness. 
However, Brende [143] asserts that hypervigilance in the left 
hemisphere could involve lateral inhibition of the emotional 
processing of the right hemisphere. Conversely, skin 
conductivity from the left hand reflects the activity of the 
right hemisphere, which processes or regulates traumatic 
imagery and its emotional impact in PTSD [143]. Thus, skin 
conductivity may not only indicate the degree of 
physiological arousal, but also the functional specificity of 
the left and right hemispheres during traumatic imagery.  
  The findings of Pitman et al. [130] and Brende [143] 
suggest that skin conductance biofeedback could be useful in 
the treatment of PTSD [see also 137]. This biofeedback 
could help PTSD patients to control their physiological 
arousal, to decrease their anxiogenic feedback. The ability to 
reduce anxious physiological responses to traumatic imagery 
could be an important aspect of the recovery process. For 
instance, Boudewyns and Hyer [144] used the physiological 
assessment technique of Pitman et al. [130] and found that 
therapeutic reductions in symptoms are associated with 
decreases in heart rate and especially skin conductance 
responses to traumatic imagery immediately after therapy. 
Boudewyns and Hyer [144] also reported that an exposure or 
flooding therapy reduces heart rate and skin conductance 
responses to traumatic imagery.  
  Murburg [145] points out interesting peripheral 
relationships to central processes. For instance, traumatic 
visualizations may induce increased peripheral epinephrine 
concentrations that increase memory consolidation by 
stimulating the amygdala, which is important in emotional 
stimulus evaluation and memory [see also 146, 147]. Also, 
“responding to a stressor . . . may itself leave behind 
molecular ‘memory traces’ that so alter involved neural 
pathways as to predispose them to be more readily activated 
in the future” [145, p. 354]. Reduction of peripheral 
hypersensitivity during psychotherapy promotes recovery 
from PTSD, which highlights the importance of visceral 
reinforcement for the maintenance of traumatic schemata 
[144] [cf. 32, 148].  
4.5. Summary  
  These research studies have demonstrated sensitivity to 
traumatic information in PTSD, which is apparent in both 
neurocognitive and peripheral responses. Cognitive studies 
demonstrate traumatic sensitivity in attention and memory 
tasks, which is positively associated with intrusive 
symptoms. ERPs are enhanced for traumatic stimuli during 
both early sensory (N1) and later stimulus evaluation (P3) 
processes. ERPs also indicate that PTSD patients fail to 
discriminate relevant targets from irrelevant traumatic 
distracters. The ERP studies do not indicate sensitivity for 
emotional information in general, the sensitivity appears to 
be specific to trauma. Stimulus novelty is an important 
aspect of research design, several ERP studies indicate 
greater novelty responses in PTSD, even for non-traumatic 
stimuli. Some studies do not demonstrate sensitivity to 
traumatic stimuli, possibly due to extended traumatic 
presentations that evoke avoidance strategies; the sensitivity 
to trauma may be observed only for brief trauma stimuli or 
voluntary traumatic imagery. Neuroimaging during 
voluntary traumatic imagery demonstrates increased activity 
in limbic and paralimbic areas (the amygdala, medial 
orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, insular, and anterior and 
medial temporal cortex). These areas are engaged in 
emotional evaluation, learning and memory. Peripheral stress 
feedback into these areas may serve to maintain and 
consolidate trauma sensitivity.  
5. NEUROPSYCHOLOGY MODELS OF PTSD  
  In addition to the cognitive models of PTSD, there is a 
substantial literature on biological models of PTSD [see 
overview in 149]. Kolb [66] proposed a seminal theory to 
explain intrusive memories and associated arousal in PTSD. 
He started from a two factor learning theory that PTSD 
results from both classical conditioning of extreme 
emotional responses to traumatic stimuli (i.e., fear, terror, 
anger, rage, sadness, guilt, and indignation) and operant 
conditioning of emotional numbing, withdrawal, and 
avoidance of traumatic stimuli. Kolb [66] also proposed that 
PTSD involves excessive traumatic stimulation that 
overwhelms efficient information processing;  
Such stimulus overload occurs when the ... 
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threat to life overwhelms the cortical ... 
processes concerned with perceptual 
discrimination and effective adaptive 
responses for survival [66, p. 993].  
  Excessive threatening stimulation sensitizes neuronal 
circuits that are responsive to threat, including structures in 
the “temporal-amygdaloid complex concerned with agonistic 
behavior”, which may “lead to depression [or atrophy] of 
those synaptic processes which permit habituation and thus 
discriminative perception and learning” [66, p. 993]. As a 
result of this initial sensitization and a diminished capacity 
for discrimination, sensitivity to threatening stimuli 
generalizes, via a process of higher order conditioning, from 
an initial traumatic experience to a variety of similar 
threatening situations [66]. Furthermore, Kolb [66] proposed 
that this generalized sensitivity to threatening situations 
perpetuates agonistic affect, such that limbic activity disrupts 
frontal executive systems; in particular, the frontal systems 
that inhibit the locus ceruleus and its noradrenergic 
innervations of diverse cortical and subcortical structures. A 
possible increase in cortical and subcortical noradrenergic 
activation further enhances the sensitization and activation of 
the trauma schema [66] [see also 150]. As a result,  
in the face of perceived threats there occurs 
excessive sympathetic arousal -including 
neuroendocrine disturbances as well as 
behavioral expressions of rage and irritability 
and repetitive cortical reactivation of 
memories related to the traumatic events. The 
latter are projected in the daytime as intrusive 
thoughts and at nighttime in the recurrent 
traumatic nightmares of PTSD . . . [66, p. 
994].  
  From an evolutionary perspective, it is adaptive to 
respond to ambiguous or threat stimuli with intense and 
rapid stress reactions in dangerous situations, but the 
persistence of those reactions into more generalized, neutral 
circumstances is inappropriate and can be debilitating, which 
would appear to occur in PTSD.  
  Everly [151, 152] also proposed that PTSD comprises a 
psychological sensitivity to threat and a hyperactive stress 
response system. According to Everly [152], the cognitive 
sensitivity to threat involves frontal and cingulate cortex, 
which activate affective and somatic stress responses in 
limbic structures, the sympathetic nervous system, and 
neuroendocrine activity in the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal system. Furthermore, this system comprises a 
positive feedback loop, such that  
... affective discharge from the limbic brain 
sends neural impulses in two simultaneous 
directions: 1) to neocortical targets, and 2) to 
the skeletal musculature .... The neocortical 
centers then send impulses back to the limbic 
areas, thus sustaining affective arousal. At the 
same time, proprioceptive impulses from the 
skeletal musculature ascend via the reticular 
formation and further stimulate limbic and 
neocortical targets. This complex positive 
feedback loop serves to sustain and intensify 
[threat arousal] [152, p. 273].  
  This hyperarousal may have long-term neurological 
consequences; intense or protracted stimulation can produce 
various structural and functional changes in networks of the 
limbic system [152] [see also 153]. Everly [151] proposed 
that tonic or phasic hyperactivity of the noradrenergic system 
in the septo-hippocampal-amygdaloid formation explains 
many facets of the phenomenology of PTSD, including 
heightened startle responses and autonomic hyperactivity, 
emotional lability, irritability, fear, guilt, aggression, and 
intrusions such as flashbacks and nightmares. The 
noradrenergic system of the septo-hippocampal complex is 
involved in both the integration of novel or aversive stimulus 
information and the concomitant activation of amygdala and 
hypothalamic-pituitary responses to threat [154, 155]. Also, 
activity in the septo-hippocampalamygdaloid network is 
involved in memory and panic or fear reactions [151]. 
Moreover, noradrenergic activation of the septo-
hippocampal-amygdaloid system both inhibits its 
accommodation or habituation [151] and sensitizes it and 
facilitates its response to further novel or aversive stimuli 
[154, 155].  
  van der Kolk [50] has also discussed the role of limbic 
and cortical systems in traumatic cognitions. He proposed 
that fragmented memories in PTSD are a symptom of 
dysfunctional neural systems involved in the evaluation and 
integration of experience. Several systems are implicated, 
including (a) the parietal cortex in integration of multimodal 
sensory information, (b) the hippocampus in integration of 
episodic memory, (c) the cingulate as a modulator of 
relevant information processing (enhancing relevant and 
inhibiting irrelevant information), and (d) the prefrontal 
cortex in executive control of integrative processes [50] [see 
also 10].  
5.1. Hippocampal Volume in PTSD  
  Recent work demonstrates abnormal hippocampal 
anatomy in PTSD, which has important implications for 
cognitive functions in PTSD [145, 153, 156-166]. Functional 
neuroimaging of the hippocampus demonstrates its role in 
novel stimulus evaluation, episodic memory, and the spatio-
temporal coherence of experience [145, 153, 156-166].  
  Several studies have now employed high-resolution 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to measure the volume 
of the hippocampus in PTSD. The studies reported an 
average 10% reduction in hippocampal volume, with 
associated deficits in short-term memory [153, 156-158, 167, 
168] [cf. 169]. These studies involve careful anatomical 
judgment during the selection and measurement of 
hippocampal regions, so it is important that they involve 
blinded research designs [167]. The hippocampal atrophy is 
smaller in PTSD than amnesia. For example, Press et al. 
[170] reported a 49% reduction of hippocampal volume in 
amnesic patients (with normal parahippocampal volumes). 
These patients showed severe deficits of verbal and non-
verbal memory, while performing normally on other tasks 
[170]. Nevertheless, the functional significance of the 
hippocampal abnormality in PTSD has prompted careful 
examination of this structure.  
 Bremner  et al. [153] found an 8% reduction of right 
hippocampal volume in Vietnam veterans with PTSD, which 
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[see also 171]. Gurvits et al. [157] reported bilateral 
hippocampus reduction in combat PTSD, after controlling 
for age and whole brain volume. The decrease was greater in 
left (26%) than right (22%) hippocampus, especially after 
controlling for alcohol abuse and combat exposure. 
Hippocampal volume was negatively correlated with both 
combat exposure and PTSD symptom severity. Furthermore, 
hippocampal volume was positively correlated with several 
measures of attention and memory (digit span, arithmetic 
[WAIS-R], attention index [Wechsler memory scale], and 
delayed recall errors [Benton visual retention test]).  
  Several studies demonstrate smaller hippocampus in 
adults with a history of childhood abuse [156, 158]. Bremner 
et al. [156] found a 12% smaller left hippocampal volume in 
adult survivors of chronic childhood abuse (7 to 15 years of 
physical, sexual or emotional abuse), with 10% of this effect 
solely related to PTSD diagnosis (after sex, age, education or 
alcohol abuse were controlled). In a similar population of 
women who survived childhood sex abuse, Stein et al. [158] 
found a 5% reduction of the left hippocampus. Bremner et 
al.  [156] found no correlations between left hippocampal 
volume and verbal memory impairments (immediate and 
delayed recall and retention), trauma onset or duration, years 
since trauma cessation, or PTSD symptom severity [cf. 157]. 
Bremner et al. [156] propose that trauma early in life may 
damage hippocampal structures, but neural plasticity could 
recover the integrity of verbal memory processes. In this 
regard, they propose that some functions of the hippocampus 
may have shifted to the left temporal lobe, which was larger 
in patients [156]. However, it is also possible that larger left 
temporal lobes could be related to better visual performance, 
which might be an adaptation to a loss of verbal capacity 
[156].  
  There are some concerns that decreases in hippocampal 
volume in chronic PTSD may result from substance abuse or 
other confounds [e.g., 169, 172], and it is not clear whether 
smaller hippocampal volumes precede or follow a traumatic 
experience [171, 173]. One longitudinal study has reported 
no decrease in hippocampal volume between 1 week and 6 
months after trauma [167]. This study had tight controls over 
substance abuse and it employed a blinded measurement 
design, whereby the persons measuring hippocampal volume 
were blind to both the group and time status of the data. 
However, this study only investigated subjects older than 20 
years, after which normal development of the hippocampus 
and other limbic structures is complete, whereas some 
previous studies have investigated patients who experienced 
trauma during childhood or early adulthood. Nevertheless, 
this study identified abnormal attention and executive 
functions, despite a lack of clear evidence for hippocampal 
atrophy, suggesting that executive networks are already 
dysfunctional in the first 6 months of PTSD [167]. The 
possible conclusions are: (a) there is no hippocampal atrophy 
and previous findings are confounded, or (b) there is 
atrophy, but it may take longer than 6 months to appear, so 
atrophy is only apparent in chronic patients, or (c) a smaller 
hippocampus might predispose some people to PTSD and 
especially chronic PTSD [173].  
  With regard to (c), another study has investigated 
whether smaller hippocampal volume may indicate a 
susceptibility to PTSD. Gilbertson et al. [168] compared 
combat veterans with and without chronic PTSD, together 
with their monozygotic twins who had no combat exposure. 
They found 10% smaller hippocampal volume in the PTSD 
twin pairs and there was a significant negative relationship 
between hippocampal volume and the severity of PTSD in 
the combat veterans with PTSD (r = 0.64) and their twin 
brothers (r = 0.70). The hippocampal volume effect 
remained significant after controlling for whole brain 
volume, age, combat exposure, and noncombat trauma 
incidents (including childhood physical or sexual abuse). 
There were no significant differences in total brain volume 
or amygdala volume. They conclude that smaller 
hippocampus could be a trait indicator of the likely 
development of PTSD after traumatic exposure [168]. 
However, smaller hippocampal volume was concentrated in 
the severe PTSD cases. The group differences in 
hippocampal volume only apply to severe PTSD after 
combat exposure (CAPS > 65, based on a subsample of 24 
from 34 combat PTSD cases). Also, the combat veterans 
with PTSD had a history of more alcohol abuse than any 
other group in the study, so the results could be confounded 
by alcohol abuse. Thus, this study may provide evidence that 
combat exposure is not a necessary condition for 
hippocampal atrophy, but further longitudinal studies are 
required to confirm this conclusion [168] [see also 174].  
  The findings of abnormal neuroanatomy in PTSD may be 
specific to hippocampal volume, rather than a general or 
diffuse neurological abnormality. Bremner et al. [156] noted 
no significant differences in several regions, including 
caudate and amygdala. Similarly, Gurvits et al. [157] found 
no differences in intracranial cavity, whole brain, ventricles, 
ventricle:brain ratio, or amygdala (although, the right 
amygdala was larger in patients than controls, which 
approached significance at .07). Likewise, Gilbertson et al. 
[168] found no differences in whole brain or amygdala 
volume.  
  However, there are two reports of extra-hippocampal 
abnormality in PTSD. The first study indicated focal white 
matter lesions in only 8 of 42 combat related PTSD patients 
[175]. The lesions were in periventricular regions or near the 
white/gray cortical junctions. The lesions were not 
associated with symptom severity or comorbid depression or 
alcohol abuse. Rauch et al. [176] conducted a more 
comprehensive cortical parcellation in nurses with combat 
exposure. Although whole cortical volume was normal, this 
study clearly identified smaller cortical volume in the 
anterior cingulate and subcallosal cortex [176]. Some near 
significant decreases were identified in the angular gyrus, 
inferior occipito-temporal gyrus and the supplementary 
motor cortex [176].  
 In summary, evidence indicates reductions of 
hippocampal volume in chronic PTSD, where hippocampal 
volume is often positively associated with deficits in 
attention and short-term memory, combat exposure and the 
severity of symptoms. Some evidence suggests that chronic 
childhood abuse may contribute to hippocampal atrophy, but 
these observations are not associated with cognitive 
impairment, possibly due to neural plasticity and recovery of 
function. One longitudinal study of trauma failed to observe 
hippocampal changes after 6 months. Furthermore, this study 
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of hippocampal atrophy. Perhaps functions that involve the 
hippocampus are not necessarily related to the volume of the 
tissue, given plasticity and the distributed networks involved 
in complex cognition.  
5.2. Hippocampal Physiology and Stress  
  The CA3 region of the hippocampus is a central feedback 
target for glucocorticoids, which regulate the hypothalamic-
pituitaryadrenocortical (HPA) response to stress. Under 
stressful conditions, glucocorticoid levels increase, which is 
detected in the CA3 area of the hippocampus (among other 
locations of the HPA axis). Given this stimulus, the 
hippocampus can inhibit the hypothalamus from discharging 
corticotrophin releasing factor, thereby decreasing further 
cortisol responses to stress [145].  
  An explanation for abnormal hippocampal volume in 
PTSD is related to glucocorticoid physiology [e.g. 177]. 
Chronic, elevated levels of glucocorticoids can induce 
dendritic loss and cellular atrophy in the hippocampus [178-
182] [see also 171, 183]. Glucocorticoids can interfere with 
the reuptake of glutamate from the synaptic cleft, resulting in 
excess stimulus of post-synaptic N-methyl-D-aspartate 
(NMDA) receptors. This can result in an excess of 
intracellular calcium, which has a variety of dangerous 
metabolic activities. So, an excess of glutamate and NMDA 
activation counteracts the normal process of calcium 
extraction and cellular repair. This physiology is related to 
several explanations for hippocampal abnormality in PTSD, 
including (a) hippocampal dendritic pruning, (b) cellular 
atrophy or (c) inhibition of neurogenesis [171, 182].  
  However, several studies of glucocorticoid levels 
immediately after exposure to trauma indicate that decreased 
cortisol predicts development of PTSD, whereas increased 
cortisol predicts onset of depression [8, 183]. This evidence 
is inconsistent with the hippocampal atrophy hypothesis of 
elevated cortisol levels in PTSD. There are two ways to 
reconcile these findings: (a) hippocampal changes do not 
arise immediately after trauma, but take at least several 
weeks [182], or (b) there is an explanation for hippocampal 
atrophy that does not depend on elevated cortisol levels. This 
explanation refers to evidence of greater glucocorticoid 
receptor density and sensitivity in the HPA feedback circuits 
among people who develop PTSD, suggesting an abnormal 
sensitivity to stress and more negative feedback on the HPA 
endocrine response [183].  
  It is important to understand hippocampal pharmacology 
and it’s relations with other cortical systems for cognition. If 
the hippocampal elements of the HPA feedback circuits are 
impaired, there should be less habituation of fear and stress 
responses. A possible pharmacological mechanism involves 
acetylcholine, which is involved in fear conditioning to 
context [184]. Acetylcholine is important for hippocampal 
theta rhythms, which are thought to synchronize distributed 
neural systems and facilitate the integration of sensory 
information into context [184]. Furthermore, there may be 
important interactions between acetylcholine and NMDA 
receptors, which are implicated in hippocampal dendritic 
pruning, atrophy and neurogenesis processes [171, 172, 181-
184]. Also, the involvement of NMDA and serotonin have 
been demonstrated by inhibition of stress induced atrophy by 
application of tianeptine and phenytoin [181, 185, 186]. The 
effects on hippocampal dendrites related to glucocorticoids 
and NMDA physiology can be observed after 14 days, 
suggesting a long-term response process [182]. Acute stress 
can promote a short-term increase, but a long-term 
depression in acetylcholine activity through modulation of 
gene expression [29, 187]. The impact on cognition is also 
important, as cholinergic systems play a role in attention, 
learning and memory. For example, there is evidence of 
greater susceptibility to distraction and novelty with 
decreases in hippocampal cholinergic activity [159] [cf. 
145]. Similarly, neuroimaging implicates abnormal 
noradrenergic activity in PTSD. One PET study of an 
adrenergic stimulant (yohimbine) showed abnormal 
hippocampal activity, as well as prefrontal, orbitofrontal, 
parietal and temporal cortex [188]. Perhaps these cellular 
processes provide an explanation for the impact of trauma on 
contextual stimulus evaluation and learning in PTSD, which 
consists of generalization from one context to many contexts 
and failure to habituate. The physiological disturbances need 
not be associated with abnormal hippocampal volume [e.g. 
172]; even normal levels of glucocorticoids can induce 
dendritic remodeling [182] [cf. 183]. The effects of stress 
may be related to neurotransmission adaptations and gene 
expression [29, 187, 189, 190] [see also 32, 148]. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be a disturbance of hippocampal 
functions that play an important role in the response to 
trauma in PTSD.  
6. NEUTRAL INFORMATION PROCESSING  
  In contrast with studies of trauma sensitivity, studies of 
neutral information processing often report deficient 
responses in PTSD. The following sections review studies of 
neuropsychology, cognitive psychophysiology and cognitive 
neuroimaging during tasks that investigate neutral 
information processing, often in the absence of any traumatic 
information. In studies of neutral stimulus processing, it is 
often necessary to omit traumatic content that could provoke 
traumatic cognitions and affect in PTSD.  
6.1. Cognitive Neuropsychology  
  As discussed above, neuropsychological theory proposes 
that abnormal limbic and cortical interactions contribute to 
difficulties with perceptual discrimination and integration of 
new information into episodic memory [66, 151, 152, 154] 
[see also 4]. Studies of PTSD demonstrate deficits of 
attention and executive functions [191-200] [see also 169, 
193, 201, 202]. These deficits are observed in the 
performance of various tasks, including a continuous 
performance task, verbal fluency, comprehension, similarity 
judgments, digit-symbol substitution, and automatic tasks 
such as counting backwards, counting forwards by threes, 
and reciting the alphabet. Several studies also demonstrate 
memory impairments in PTSD; including immediate 
memory impairments in both verbal and visual tasks [191, 
192, 203, 204] and some studies identify long-term memory 
deficits for verbal tasks and famous events [191, 204], but 
results for visual tasks are equivocal [192, 200, 204, 205]. 
Also, several studies have identified deficits of auditory 
verbal learning and memory [26, 192] [cf. 201]. Gurvits et 
al. [195] indicate that cognitive impairment may precede the 
onset of PTSD [cf. 201]. Gilbertson et al. [198] compare 
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abnormal memory for neutral information is a critical 
determinant of PTSD diagnosis. Thus, neuropsychology 
studies employ trauma-neutral tasks and they most often 
demonstrate impairment of diverse executive cognitions in 
PTSD.  
6.2. Cognitive Electrophysiology  
  Cognitive electrophysiology during neutral information 
processing provides insights into the sensory discrimination, 
attention and working memory processes of PTSD [see also 
94]. The electrophysiological studies to date have largely 
focused on auditory discrimination.  
 Paige  et al. [133] employed ERPs to investigate 
responses to increasing auditory intensity in PTSD. Veterans 
with PTSD show normal increases in N1, but abnormal 
decreases in P2 amplitude as auditory intensity increases 
toward and above the startle threshold (the effect was more 
prominent in the left than the right temporal area). Paige et 
al. [133] propose that a P2 reduction indicates “protective 
inhibition” -PTSD patients inhibit stimulation that could 
overload their capacity for accurate discrimination. Lewine 
[206] replicated this study with combined EEG and 
magneto-encephalography (MEG); they found P2 reductions 
in the auditory association cortex and confirm that the effect 
is a decrease in cortical activity rather than variation in the 
location of cortical source activity. These findings suggest a 
cortical abnormality of auditory processing in PTSD.  
  Recent studies suggest abnormal sensory habituation in 
PTSD, indicated by early auditory P50 ERPs [207-209] [see 
also 138]. Neylan et al. [208] reported a sophisticated 
investigation of P50 habituation for non-startle tones and 
found less habituation in PTSD patients [see also 207]. 
Neylan et al. [208] propose that the reduced P50 habituation 
could be related to deficits in hippocampal functions, which 
normally inhibit the response of thalamic circuits to 
repetitive, innocuous stimuli [many studies have implicated 
the hippocampus and associated limbic structures in PTSD, 
[145, 153, 156-166]. These studies show that PTSD patients 
do not habituate the P50 response for non-startle repeated 
clicks, suggesting an abnormality of sensory gating in 
brainstem and thalamic circuits.  
  This evidence can be interpreted in the context of 
hypotheses about abnormal interactions among subcortical, 
limbic and cortical networks [66, 151, 152, 154]. In 
particular, the evidence supports the proposal that trauma 
leads to hyperarousal or hypersensitivity of sensory systems. 
If brainstem and thalamic circuits do not habituate, their 
cortical projections are overloaded by repetitive information. 
Kolb [66] proposed that excessive emotional arousal, 
especially threat and fear responses of the amygdala, may 
overload executive systems (e.g., anterior cingulate), leading 
to less control of subcortical and primary sensory cortical 
activity, with consequent deficits in cortical discrimination 
and adaptive response processes [210]. Primarily, thalamic 
nuclei become hypersensitive to any stimulus change, so 
their projections to the cortex can overload the capacity to 
process sensory information and impair corticothalamic 
feedback required for effective early discrimination and 
habituation. Furthermore, a vicious cycle of hyperarousal 
ensues, as the capacity of cortical processes to regulate 
brainstem arousal nuclei diminishes. Hence, brainstem 
arousal centers, such as the reticular system and the locus 
coeruleus, may escape from cortical control and further 
enhance the sensitivity of thalamic circuits and their 
associations with limbic and cortical networks. Thus, there 
could be abnormal interactions of thalamic circuits and 
cortical systems in PTSD, resulting in impaired neutral 
stimulus information processing.  
  This evidence complements the findings that patients 
have a lower threshold at which sensory discrimination is 
overloaded by intense stimulation, promoting cortical 
inhibition of excessive stimulation. The primary auditory 
cortex demonstrates a stimulus driven response, with N1 
augmentation to increasing stimulus intensity, but the 
auditory association cortex demonstrates active inhibition of 
excessive stimulation [i.e., P2 reductions; 133, 206]. It may 
be only at the level of associative cortical control that the 
early gating deficits are counteracted [133]. Kolb [66] 
hypothesized that frontal cortical systems for executive 
control of subcortical brainstem and other thalamic circuits 
may be deficient. The efficient modulation of elementary 
sensory discrimination processes is important for adaptive 
stimulus information processing, so these initial insights into 
Kolb’s [66] hypothesis form an important contribution to 
understanding PTSD.  
  An interesting study of sensory processing in the absence 
of attention has some important implications for any theory 
of early sensory processing in PTSD. Morgan and Grillon 
[211] investigated sensory discrimination, using an auditory 
mismatch negativity (MMN) task that does not require active 
attention, for PTSD patients who suffered sexual assault. 
They found no indications of abnormal P50, N1 or P2 ERPs, 
but enhanced N2 amplitude, due to a larger MMN, in PTSD 
patients. The habituation of P50 activity is difficult to 
investigate and the report by Neylan et al. [208] employed 
sophisticated analysis procedures to clarify this issue, so 
their results may carry greater weight than other studies that 
are not specifically designed to evaluate the P50. 
Nevertheless, based on their evidence, Morgan and Grillon 
[211] conclude that the P50, N1 and P2 ERPs indicate no 
abnormality of auditory pathways and cortical processing in 
PTSD [which is consistent with studies of similar auditory 
discrimination tasks; see discussion below on 105, 212-216]. 
However, Morgan and Grillon [211] find that the enhanced 
MMN suggests greater activity related to auditory 
discrimination in PTSD [cf., 212, 215]. The MMN is thought 
to indicate the automatic detection of auditory stimulus 
changes, involving stimulus registration and comparison in 
sensory memory [e.g., 82, part 3]. This result suggests that 
previous findings of abnormal sensory discrimination in 
PTSD may be related to controlled attention modulations of 
sensory discrimination. That is, there may be abnormalities 
in the systems that control top-down modulation of sensory 
discrimination in PTSD.  
  These findings of Morgan and Grillon [211] should be 
replicated, due to concerns about comorbid panic disorder in 
that study. Nearly half of the PTSD sample had comorbid 
panic disorder (PD) with agoraphobia. It is possible that their 
findings of abnormal early sensory discrimination could be 
related to comorbid PD [217, 218]. Most studies of PD 
indicate abnormal activity of later, evaluation processing 
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activity for PTSD patients with comorbid PD [105]. It is not 
yet clear if this comorbidity has implications for early ERP 
activity, such as the MMN.  
  If there is abnormal early sensory processing in PTSD, it 
is not clear whether cortical control processes can recover 
the integrity of information processing. Several ERP studies 
demonstrate abnormal activity during attention and working 
memory tasks in PTSD. In an ERP study of PTSD, 
McFarlane et al. [212] employed a three-tone discrimination 
task with common tones (1000 Hz) and both rare distracter 
(500 Hz) and target tones (2000 Hz, all stimuli had a 
constant duration and sub-startle intensity). For these neutral 
tones, PTSD patients had a slower response time and both 
later N2 and smaller P3 ERPs for infrequent target tones, 
there was also no difference of P3 amplitude for target and 
distracter tones. These findings were replicated several times 
[213, 215, 225]. The findings implicate cortical processing 
engaged in sensory discrimination, stimulus evaluation and 
working memory processes. The increase in N2 latency 
suggests difficulty with auditory discrimination [226] [cf. 
211]. The smaller P3 amplitude could reflect deficits in the 
evaluation of stimulus relevance or meaning [227, 228]. In a 
further study of the P3 evaluation process, subjects were 
required to detect consecutive repeats in a five tone 
discrimination task, which required frequent updating of the 
physical attributes of target tones [214]. Smaller P3 activity 
for common and target tones indicated deficits in working 
memory processing for PTSD patients [214, 215]. This 
deficit was further investigated in the visual modality, which 
also indicated abnormal frontal and parietal ERP topography 
during working memory in PTSD [216, 229]. These 
indications of abnormal attention and working memory 
processes can be related to the capacity to regulate traumatic 
intrusions in PTSD [48]. Thus, these studies extend the 
findings of abnormal early sensory processing to later 
aspects of cortical processing engaged in stimulus 
discrimination, evaluation and working memory integration.  
  The decrease of P3 amplitude may be related to 
catecholamine dysfunction in PTSD. Kolb [66] hypothesized 
that sensory discrimination is affected by catecholamines, 
providing an important theoretical link between 
neurophysiology and cognition [see also 10, 154]. There is 
evidence that catecholamine neurotransmission modulates 
the capacity for attention [230-234]. An indication that 
catecholamines can normalize deficits of P3 activity in 
PTSD was found in studies of PTSD related to combat and 
sexual abuse [105, 235]. These findings indicate that 
catecholamine medications may normalize brain activity 
related to attention processes in PTSD and they provide 
partial support for Kolb’s [66] hypothesis of catecholamine 
effects on cognitive processes in PTSD.  
  These findings of abnormal P3 in PTSD can be modified 
by symptom severity and comorbidity. There are decreases 
in P3 and slower reaction times with dissociative and 
numbing symptoms [103, 104], as well as depression 
symptoms [105]. There are increases in P3 with panic 
symptoms [105, 219, 235]. Furthermore, the abnormality in 
P3 processes is not specific to PTSD [236], it has been 
observed in diverse psychiatric conditions, which suggests a 
central role for these processes in integrated cognition.  
  The neutral stimulus processing in PTSD could vary with 
affective states. That is, attention bias theory would predict 
that during stressful or traumatic affect, the attention 
available for neutral stimuli decreases. However, Kaufman 
[103] found no effects of emotional state on P3 responses to 
neutral stimuli. Previous work has either included emotive or 
trauma content into task materials or ensured that all task 
materials and the emotional context are neutral [102]. 
Kaufman [103] employed a neutral auditory discrimination 
task with prior induction of an affective context. Across 
three affective contexts, neutral, stressful and traumatic, 
there were no modulations of the P3 effects for neutral 
auditory processing. However, the emotional context did 
have an impact on dissociative states, which were related to 
P3 effects for distracters [102, 103]. This study suggests that 
attention biases are not simply a result of general affective 
states, but rather they arise as specific responses to stimulus 
information.  
  The distraction in PTSD could be dependent on the 
novelty of the information, because several studies 
demonstrate larger P3 activity for novel stimuli in PTSD. 
Blomhoff et al. [102] found larger frontal activity at 200-300 
msec for rare, novel acoustic non-words in PTSD, which is 
very similar to P3a effects that indicate an orientation of 
attention to novel stimuli. They also found that this frontal 
activity between 150- 300 msec was positively associated 
with the arousal, avoidance and intrusion symptoms of 
PTSD. Similarly, Kimble et al. [237] investigated novelty 
sensitivity in combat veterans with or without PTSD. They 
used two auditory tasks. One was a three-tone oddball task, 
with 1000Hz common tones, 500Hz rare distracters and 
2000Hz rare target tones. The second task was almost 
identical, except the 500Hz rare distracters were replaced 
with various novel sounds (clicks, buzzes, etc.). If PTSD 
patients are susceptible to novel distraction, they expected to 
see larger ERP activity for the novel stimuli. Also, they 
expected to see greater impairment of target processing in 
the novel task. In fact, their results show that all subjects did 
have smaller P3 activity for targets during the novelty task, 
indicating that novel stimuli diverted attention from the 
primary task. However, there were no group differences in 
this deficit for target processing
2.
 
There was a group by task 
interaction for distracters, which comprised greater frontal 
P3 amplitude for novel than pure tone distracters in PTSD. 
The effect identified was significant after adjustment for 
combat exposure and comorbid panic disorder (there was no 
correction for depression). This finding required 
comparisons between neutral and novel, ambiguous 
distracters. With similar task designs, it is possible to explore 
the effects of emotional distracters [c.f., 102, 238]. The novel 
sounds in these studies were not related to traumatic 
experience and therefore suggest that threat sensitivity in 
PTSD extends beyond traumatic stimuli to any ambiguous 
novel stimuli.  
6.3. Cognitive Neuroimaging  
 Semple  et al. [239, 240] found abnormal activity in 
parietal attention systems during neutral information 
processing in PTSD [see also 241]. They investigated rCBF 
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in combat PTSD during an auditory continuous performance 
task (CPT), which required vigilant attention and 
discrimination for rare target events. PTSD patients had poor 
discrimination of targets and decreased rCBF in the angular 
gyrus of the right parietal cortex, a brain region that is 
implicated in multimodal attention processes [239, 240, 242, 
243]. The parietal rCBF was positively associated with 
performance accuracy [239, 240]. Although the patient group 
had a comorbid substance abuse, the authors suggest their 
results are due to PTSD, because patients abstained for 
several weeks before the study and the PTSD results were 
inconsistent with results from another substance abuse group 
[239, 240].  
  Several recent papers demonstrate abnormal functional 
activity in PTSD for neutral stimuli [244-246]. Clark et al. 
[245] employed PET during two target detection tasks, using 
the same visual stimuli, with two different task instructions. 
In one task, a target word remained constant, while the other 
task required detection of repeated words (a variable target). 
The latter task required greater verbal working memory 
updating, as each non-target word became a new target 
template. In controls, activation was identified in a working 
memory network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate, as well 
as the supramarginal gyrus of the inferior parietal lobe [246]. 
PTSD patients demonstrated less prefrontal activity, 
especially in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, with 
possible compensation apparent in greater activity in the 
right parietal cortex [229, 244, 245]. This pattern of activity 
was taken to indicate deficits in prefrontal control of 
working memory content, which may be stored as 
multimodal representations in posterior parietal regions. The 
deficit in left prefrontal activity may be associated with 
decreased verbal skills in PTSD, which has been observed in 
studies of traumatic information processing [114]. In contrast 
with those studies of traumatic imagery, activation was 
identified in the middle frontal gyrus, which is implicated in 
speech production and more complex integration of 
information in working memory [247-250]. Thus, this work 
demonstrates a more fundamental difficulty with working 
memory for neutral information in PTSD, which is 
consistent with theories about the dissociation of traumatic 
memory from linguistic, narrative encoding [50]. Also, the 
integrity of working memory processes can be related to the 
capacity to control intrusive memories [48].  
6.4. Psychophysiology  
  PTSD patients have high cardiovascular activity, 
including increased heart rates and diastolic and systolic 
blood pressure, during resting periods of laboratory research 
[128, 140], and before a routine outpatients physical 
examination [251]. Casada [141] found that PTSD patients 
have higher baseline electrodermal activity, but not heart 
rate, in comparison with combat and non-combat controls. 
Furthermore, PTSD patients have often demonstrated a 
heightened startle response to sudden loud tones, which is 
indicated by increased eye blink amplitude, heart rate, skin 
conductivity, and diminished habituation of skin 
conductivity over several tone presentations [132, 133, 135, 
136]. An exception to these findings is that PTSD patients 
show no significant startle response to 2 sec of white noise 
presented at 80 dB [129]. PTSD patients may be less 
responsive to the white noise, which had a longer duration 
and a different sound texture, than the sudden tones 
presented in other studies.  
  The physiological hyperactivity in PTSD, while among 
neutral circumstances, cannot be explained as a conditioned 
response. Shalev et al. [135, 136] proposed that hyperarousal 
symptoms indicate a genetic disposition or an acquired 
sensitivity to autonomic reactivity and a diminished 
habituation of autonomic responses. Gerardi [251] proposed 
that PTSD patients may activate a cognitive fear network 
during any laboratory or hospital visit and this promotes 
physiological arousal.  
6.5. Summary  
  Psychophysiology studies indicate hyperarousal in 
PTSD, even among relatively neutral circumstances. At the 
cognitive level, neuropsychology studies indicate deficits in 
various attention and memory tasks. Several ERP studies 
demonstrate abnormal thalamic gating and early sensory 
processing for auditory tones in PTSD. There is also 
evidence for abnormal stimulus discrimination, evaluation 
and working memory integration, indicated by abnormal N2 
and P3 ERPs in PTSD. Finally, several studies of rCBF 
demonstrate abnormal activity in frontal and parietal systems 
engaged in attention and working memory processes.  
7. CONCLUSIONS  
  A traumatic experience can promote development of a 
trauma schema, consisting of sensory, affective, and 
intentional information that may be dissociated from 
linguistic, symbolic representation. This trauma schema not 
only facilitates assimilation of traumatic information, but 
also encourages appraisal of novel or ambiguous events as 
threats to well-being. Cognitive and electrophysiological 
studies have demonstrated heightened sensitivity for 
traumatic and possibly novel stimuli in PTSD. Of particular 
interest are the ERP studies that show early, automatic 
attention to traumatic stimuli and greater conscious attention 
to the significance or meaning of traumatic images. Also, 
neuroimaging indicates greater activation in the limbic 
system during traumatic recollection, especially the 
amygdala, with associated abnormalities in the appraisal 
systems of the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate regions. 
This work also demonstrates that traumatic recollection is 
associated with diminished activity in left inferior frontal 
cortex, which suggests that traumatic memories consist of 
sensory and emotional elements without concomitant 
linguistic associations. Many cohort studies demonstrate an 
association between trauma sensitivity and the severity of 
PTSD symptoms, especially traumatic intrusions. 
Longitudinal studies of the association between cognition 
and symptom development may clarify whether any 
sensitivity to threat and trauma content precedes or follows 
traumatic experience. The PTSD symptom profile may be 
evaluated with regard to the interactions of cognitive and 
affective processes with peripheral physiology. It is 
important to study the integration of central neural systems 
with the peripheral physiology. Many studies investigate one 
or another of these aspects, yet this will not clarify the causal 
relations between cognitive and affective appraisals and 
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neuroendocrine and autonomic regulation, which are 
important feedback indicators to central processes. For this 
reason, desensitization of peripheral autonomic responses to 
traumatic cognitions may play an important role in recovery 
from PTSD.  
  A bias toward traumatic cognitions may interfere with 
adaptive cognitive structures for processing neutral 
information. There is no conclusive evidence of deficits in 
neutral information processing in the concurrent presence of 
traumatic information, only that traumatic stimulation 
decreases the ability to discriminate relevant neutral 
information from traumatic distractions. However, there is 
considerable evidence of abnormal neutral information 
processing in PTSD, in the absence of traumatic information. 
There is support for the neuropsychological theory of Kolb 
[66] in the ERP research that demonstrates greater protective 
inhibition in PTSD (suggesting the threshold at which 
accurate discrimination occurs is lower in PTSD, promoting 
earlier inhibition of excessive stimulation). Further ERP 
research has also demonstrated a difficulty in the conscious 
evaluation of the significance or relevance of neutral 
information. This latter difficulty has also been related to 
abnormal rCBF in several areas of a cortical network 
engaged in attention and working memory processes. There 
is also evidence of susceptibility to novel distraction in 
PTSD, which could be related to abnormal hippocampal, 
parahippocampal and prefrontal attention systems engaged in 
contextual novelty processing.  
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